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Climate Change and Animals 
 
 
Wayne Hsiung* and Cass R. Sunstein** 
 
Abstract 
 
 Climate change is already having adverse effects on animal life, and those effects 
are likely to prove devastating in the future. Nonetheless, the relevant harms to animals 
have yet to become a serious part of the analysis of climate change policy. Even if 
animals and species are valued solely by reference to human preferences, inclusion of 
their welfare dramatically increases the argument for aggressive responses to climate 
change. We estimate that, even under conservative assumptions about valuation, losses to 
nonhuman life might run into the hundreds of billions of dollars annually. Whatever the 
precise figure, the general conclusion is clear: An appreciation of the likely loss of 
animal life leads to a massive increase in the assessment of the overall damage and cost 
of climate change.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Polar bears depend heavily on arctic sea ice for their survival. When sea ice 
breaks up and drifts as a result of polar warming, the bears must move northward to find 
stable platforms. Hunting becomes more difficult, because the bears are rarely successful 
in finding food on open water. Pregnant females, who must leave the ice to find their 
preferred terrestrial den areas, are forced to swim great distances, and fast for long 
periods, as the ice drifts farther from land. Even if pregnancy is successful, the bear 
cubs—raised in suboptimal habitats with malnourished mothers—are most unlikely to 
flourish.1 
  Harlequin frogs are a vibrantly colorful and active genus of frog in Central and 
South America. They have suffered widespread extinction in the 20th century—67% of 
110 species—despite attempts at habitat protection. The culprit is apparently a pathogenic 
                                                 
* Searle Fellow, Northwestern University School of Law. 
** Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, 
University of Chicago. We are grateful to Chris Thomas, Eric Posner, and Michael Oppenheimer for 
valuable comments on a previous draft, and to Yi-Ling Teo for research assistance. 
1 Andrew E. Derocher, Nicholas J. Lunn, and Ian Stirling, Polar Bears in a Warming Climate, 44 Integr. 
Comp. Bio. 163 (2004). Polar bears were listed as threatened by extinction for the first time in the World 
Convervation Union’s “red list” in 2006.  See IUCN Red List (visited Sept. 9, 2006) 
<http://www.iucn.org/themes/ssc/redlist2006/redlist2006.htm>.  
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outbreak triggered by climate change. The chytrid fungus grows on the frogs’ moist skin 
and eats away at their epidermis and teeth, before ultimately killing them. Tellingly, 
approximately 80% of the lost harlequin species have disappeared after an unusually 
warm preceding year.2  
 The British ring ouzel, a shy species of thrush with a high chirping call, has been 
in decline for most of the 20th century. Up to 58% of the population has disappeared 
from 1988–99, and as few as 6000 mating pairs are left. High temperatures and 
precipitation in the preceding year have been linked to subsequent declines in the ring 
ouzel population. Biologists speculate that temperature and rainfall extremes have led to 
a decrease in food availability.3 
 These are but three examples of the potential impact of anthropogenic climate 
change on animal life and welfare. While the current effects of climate change on human 
beings are disputed,4 there is little question that the impact on animal life is already 
substantial.5 Projections into the future are much bleaker. One particularly dramatic 
study, published in Nature in 2004, suggests that 15–37% of all species—potentially 
millions—could be committed to extinction by 2050 as a result of anthropogenic climate 
change.6 
Yet conventional economic analysis of climate change has virtually ignored these 
effects on nonhuman life.7 A highly influential study, by economists William Nordhaus 
and Joseph Boyer, treats the welfare cost of species loss as too small or uncertain to be 
quantified.8 Bjorn Lomborg’s well-known analysis of the problem simply fails to discuss 
                                                 
2 J. Alan Pounds et al., Widespread amphibian extinctions from epidemic disease driven by global 
warming, 439 Nature 161 (2006).  
3 Colin M. Beale et al, Climate change may account for the decline in British ring ouzels, 75 Journal of 
Animal Ecology 826 (2006).  
4 Some studies suggest that up to 150,000 human lives are already lost annually due to climate change.  See 
Jonathan A. Patz et al, Impact of regional climate change on human health, 438 Nature 310 (2005).  
5 See, for example, Chris D. Thomas, et al, Extinction risk from climate change, 427 Nature 145 (2004); 
Camille Parmesan and Gary Yohe, A globally coherent fingerprint of climate change impacts across natural 
systems, 421 Nature 27 (2003); and Terry L. Root, et al, Fingerprints of global warming on wild animals 
and plants, 421 Nature 57 (2003).  
6 Thomas, supra note _.  
7 Climate change will harm all forms of nonhuman life in natural systems. We focus on animals, however, 
because harm to animals will comprise the lion’s share of the social welfare costs stemming from 
destruction to natural systems.  
8 William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World (2001), ch 4. 
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animals at all.9 Richard Tol, in contrast, recognizes the impact of climate change on 
natural ecosystems but arbitrarily stipulates a fixed $50 per person willingness to pay to 
“protect natural habitats” regardless of the anticipated impact.10  
The result of these omissions and stipulations is almost certainly to underestimate, 
by a large margin, the monetary cost of climate change. Consider the fact that in 2004 
alone, federal, state, and local governments in the United States spent over $1.4 billion to 
protect around 1,340 entities (a mere thousandth of the threatened loss from climate 
change) under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and expenditures have increased 
dramatically in recent years as more species have been added to the endangered list.11 
Moreover, an expenditure measure may well underestimate the true value of endangered 
species protection, since most of the costs of the ESA are compliance and opportunity 
costs, stemming from the inability of landowners or government to engage in otherwise 
valuable projects. One study estimates that the true annual cost of the ESA (and thus its 
implied minimum value) is six times greater than nominal government expenditures12—
implying an annual figure of $8.4 billion for 2004. 
A skeptic might try to justify the neglect of animal life in climate change policy 
analysis in two ways. First, the value of nonhuman life—and the ESA—is heavily 
debated, and any particular figures will be easy to question. Second, scientific and 
conceptual uncertainty about climate and natural systems has clouded any attempt at 
quantification. In 1996, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) wrote, 
“Perhaps the category in which losses from climate change could be among the largest, 
yet where past research has been the most limited, is that of ecosystem impacts. 
Uncertainties arise both because of the unknown character of ecosystem impacts, and 
because of the difficulty of assessing these impacts from a socioeconomic point of view 
and translating them into welfare costs.”13  
                                                 
9 Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist (2001), ch. 24. 
10 Richard Tol, Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change, 21 Environmental and Resource 
Economics 47 (2002). Tol himself notes the importance of better analysis in the area. See Tol, 55.  
11 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal and State Endangered and Threatened Species Expenditures: 
Fiscal Year 2004, ii-iii (2005).  
12 Randy T. Simmons and Kimberly Frost, Accounting for Species, Property and Environment Research 
Center (2004), available at <http://www.perc.org/pdf/esa_costs.pdf>.  
13 IPCC, Climate Change 1995 – Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change (1996), 200.  
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 In this Article, we contend that neither of these reasons can justify the failure to 
take account of the effects of climate change on animals. First, animal life matters, both 
for its own sake and because human beings care about it. As noted above, the U.S. spends 
billions of dollars to protect a relatively small number of species under the ESA. 
Contingent valuation studies consistently show high willingness-to-pay for the protection 
of animals. Other recent studies have suggested highly significant instrumental value for 
biodiversity in areas such as agriculture and medical research. Second, the scientific 
uncertainty over the impact of climate change on natural systems is rapidly diminishing. 
Many of the most important discoveries have been made only in the past few years, so 
previous analysts may have been right to assume that scientific knowledge was 
insufficient to permit precise judgments about damages or causality. But the most 
extreme claims of causal ambiguity are no longer tenable. And while it is an 
understatement to say that the magnitude of the effect of climate change on animals is 
still debated, its direction and general significance are not. Climate change will impose 
enormous costs on nonhuman life. And ignoring these costs, in evaluation of climate 
change policy, is no longer excusable. 
This Article comes in four parts. Part I surveys the recent scientific literature that 
identifies the potential impact of climate change on animals and other nonhuman life. 
Part II explores why and how animal welfare might be counted in the evaluation of 
climate change regulation. Part III offers a partial and highly tentative estimate of the 
monetized loss from the impact of climate change on nonhuman life. Even under 
conservative assumptions, focused solely on extinctions and excluding other kinds of 
animal suffering and death, we estimate that this loss will run into the hundreds of 
billions annually. Despite the tentativeness of the particular number, the unambivalent 
conclusion is that prevailing estimates of the costs of climate change must be 
dramatically increased. In Part IV, we conclude.  
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II. Some Effects of Climate Change 
 
 The fact of anthropogenic climate change is no longer in serious dispute.14  
Carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere have risen to a level probably unseen in millions 
of years.15 Global temperatures have increased by 0.6°C in the 20th century, and are 
projected to increase an additional 1.4–5.8°C for the period from 1990 to 2100.16  Sea 
levels rose by 0.1–0.2 m in the twentieth century, and are expected to rise an additional 
0.09–0.88 m in the next hundred years.17 Extreme weather events may begin to occur 
with increasing frequency.18 Perhaps most ominously, some scientists have hypothesized 
that disruptions to the ocean’s thermohaline circulation due to warming of polar waters 
might perversely trigger an abrupt and massive cooling event.19  
 These climatic shifts are expected to have a series of negative effects on human 
society. Agriculture will suffer from changes in temperature and extreme weather events. 
Human health will decline, as cases of heat stress increase, and diseases such as malaria 
spread to previously inaccessible regions. Cities such as Venice might be damaged or 
destroyed by changes in sea level.20 
There is significant debate, however, about the proper accounting for these 
potential harms, especially for the United States. Nordhaus and Boyer, for example, 
report that the net cost of gradual climate change on the United States, under moderate 
scenarios, might be “close to zero” because of adaptive responses.21 Mendelsohn and 
Neumann conclude that climate change will create net benefits in the U.S.—largely by 
boosting agricultural production.22 In contrast, Fankhauser and Tol both find that climate 
                                                 
14 See Andrew Dessler and Edward Parson, The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change (2006); 
John Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing (3d ed. 2004). 
15 R.T. Pierrehumbert, Climate Change: A Catastrophe in Slow Motion, 6 Chi. J. Int’l L. 573 (2006).  
16 Percival et al., supra note _, at 1058. 
17 J.T. Houghton, et al, eds, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: The 
Scientific Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge 2001). 
18 David R. Easterling, Climate Extremes: Observations, Modeling, and Impacts, 289 Science 2068 (2000). 
19 R.B. Alley et al, Abrupt Climate Change, 299 Science 2005 (2003). 
20 See Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note _, ch. 4.  
21 Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note _ at 32.  
22 Robert Mendelsohn and James E. Neumann, The Impact of Climate Change on the United States 
Economy (1999). See also Olivier Deschênes and Michael Greenstone, The Economic Impacts of Climate 
Change: Evidence from Agricultural Profits and Random Fluctuations in Weather (forthcoming 2006).  
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change will cause more than $70 billion in annual costs to the U.S.23 Some estimates are 
much higher.24 The most recent IPCC panel took a quite different approach: By shifting 
its focus from evaluation of costs to their mitigation, the panel implicitly assumed that the 
impact of climate change justified attempts to mitigate its effects regardless of the 
costs.25 
Notably missing from the debate about the costs of climate change, however, has 
been a recognition of its potential impact on nonhuman life. As noted above, this is in 
part due to scientific uncertainty. The IPCC emphasized the “unknown character” of 
potential ecosystem impacts.26 A string of recent studies, however, has served to reduce 
this uncertainty.  
Consider one finding: A global pattern of “poleward” shifts in habitat range has 
emerged across ecosystems.27 As temperatures have increased globally, species have 
been forced to move to cooler regions; climate change thus acts as a source of human-
induced habitat loss. A recent study found that climate change had caused an average 6.1 
km per decade poleward shift in range in the 20th century. The required per-decade shift 
would be magnified under the predictions of even greater temperature change for the 21st 
century. Of course, if new regions and ecosystems were always perfect and perfectly-
accessible substitutes for a species’ old habitat, then there would be no negative impact 
from such range shifting. (Even if so, many individual animals would suffer and die.) But 
shifting is generally imperfect: climate change can move faster than species; natural or 
human-made barriers can prevent shifting; and geographically-contiguous habitat is 
sometimes simply ecologically unsuitable.28 
Climate change has also caused a chronological shift in “spring events,” such as 
migrant arrival and nesting dates. Such events are occurring earlier in the season—a 2.3 
                                                 
23 Samuel Fankhauser, Valuing Climate Change (1995) and Richard S. Tol, The damage costs of climate 
change: Towards more comprehensive calculations, 5 Environmental and Resource Economics 353 
(1995).  
24 Claudia Kemfert, Global Climate Protection: Immediate Action Will Avert High Costs, 1 DIW Weekly 
Report 135-141 (2005); Frank Ackerman and Ian Finlayson, The Economics of Inaction on Climate 
Change: A Sensitivity Analysis (forthcoming 2007). 
25 See Lomborg, supra note _ at 301.  
26 See IPCC, supra note _.  
27 Camille Parmesan and Gary Yohe, A globally coherent fingerprint of climate change impacts across 
natural systems, 421 Nature 27 (2003). 
28 See Chris D. Thomas, et al, Extinction risk from climate change, 427 Nature 145 (2004). 
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day per decade shift has been demonstrated in a study of 172 species.29 As with range 
shifts, this change need not have a direct negative effect. Going to work an hour earlier is 
not intrinsically harmful. But many species have behavioral patterns, such as migration, 
that are not linked to seasonal temperature change. And if chronological shifting is either 
absent or imperfectly linked to temperature, animals will suffer as they attempt to feed, 
breed, and raise their young in excessively warm or rainy seasonal conditions.30 
 Species that cannot adjust to climate change, either geographically or 
chronologically, face a number of severe difficulties. Heat is a direct stressor of animal 
physiology.31 Rising temperatures affect the availability of vegetation and food necessary 
for survival.32 Various biological mechanisms affected by temperature—such as nesting 
and mating—go haywire under abnormal temperature conditions.33 Diseases triggered by 
threshold climate events become more common and deadly.34 And species must expend 
more time and energy on thermoregulation, when their climatic environment is 
suboptimal.35 
 Extreme weather events, and abrupt climate change, also hit animals hard. Even 
aside from the direct damage of storms, periods of abnormal precipitation or drought can 
have adverse behavioral and physiological consequences on species ranging from 
elephants to turtles.36 The most recent example of abrupt climate change stemming from 
disruption of the ocean’s thermohaline circulation system—the Younger Dryas event 
10,000–11,000 years ago—led to catastrophic ecosystem disruption and extinction.37 
 One study modeled the expected impact of gradual climate change on 1,103 
species (including mammals, birds, reptiles, and insects) and predicted that a remarkable 
                                                 
29 See Parmesan and Yohe, supra note _.   
30 See, for example, Christiaan Both and Marcel E. Visser, Adjustment to climate change is constrained by 
arrival date in a long-distance migratory bird, 411 Nature 296 (2001).  
31 William R. Dawson, Physiological responses of animals to higher temperatures, in Global Warming and 
Biological Diversity 158 (Robert L. Peters & Thomas E. Lovejoy eds., 1992). 
32 Kevin M. Johnston and Oswald J. Schmitz, Wildlife and climate change: assessing the sensitivity of 
selected species to simulated doubling of atmospheric CO2, 3 Global Change Biology 531 (1997).  
33 Marcel E. Visser, et al, Warmer springs leads to mistimed reproduction in great tits, 265 Proc. R. Soc. 
Lond. 1867 (1998).  
34 Pounds, et al, supra note _.  
35 Arthur E. Dunham and Karen L. Overall, Population responses to environmental change, 34 American 
Zoologist 382 (1993).  
36 David R. Easterling, Climate Extremes: Observations, Modeling, and Impacts, 289 Science 2068 (2000). 
37 See R.B. Alley et al, Abrupt Climate Change, 299 Science 2005 (2003) and Dorothy Peteet, Sensitivity 
and rapidity of vegetational response to abrupt climate change, 97 Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 1359 (2000).  
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15–37% would be committed to extinction by 2050.38 In contrast, over that same period, 
global habitat loss—the other major source of ecosystem destruction—leads to projected 
extinction ranges from 1–29%, with a figure in the lower end of that range being most 
plausible. That is, climate change might very well be more destructive to nonhuman life 
than all other sources of habitat loss combined.39 The lead researcher of the relevant 
study has stated that “well over a million species could be threatened with extinction as a 
result of climate change.”40 In comparison, the 1,340 entities protected by the ESA are 
but a drop in the biodiversity bucket.  
 While such projections are becoming increasingly common, a great deal of 
scientific uncertainty remains, and the concrete estimates detailed above have been 
subject to many criticisms.41 The models used for climate change impact projections, like 
all models, are simplifications of the real world.42 The fact of causation is not seriously 
disputed, but the precise causal mechanisms for observed and anticipated species loss 
have been difficult to identify.43 In addition, the specific regions and species surveyed 
might not be representative of the global pattern of risk. Finally, as in previous periods of 
catastrophic ecosystem disruption, new species will eventually move in to replace the 
old,44 and some animals are even predicted to benefit from climate change.45 It is 
indisputable, however, that many animals will not be so lucky. Like human beings, 
                                                 
38 Thomas, supra note _. The 15% projection is associated with low climate change scenarios for 2050, i.e. 
an 0.8-1.7°C increase in global temperature. The 37% projection is associated with high climate change 
scenarios, i.e. >2.0°C.  
39 Ibid at 146.  
40 Press release from University of Leeds, available at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/media/current/extinction.htm.  
41 See Richard  J. Laddle, et al, Dangers of crying wolf over risk of extinctions, 428 Nature 799 (2004).  
42 An alternative and recently released extinction study takes a different approach from the Thomas study, 
by focusing on expected loss of vegetation as a proxy for extinction. The reported extinction range is 1-
43%. Jay R. Malcolm, et al, Global Warming and Extinctions of Endemic Species from Biodiversity 
Hotspots, 20 Conservation Biology 538 (2006). We focus on the Thomas figures because the Malcolm 
study is likely to under-report extinctions, since it analyzes biodiversity effects only when a vegetation 
class changes. 
43 See J. Alan Pounds and Robert Puschendorf, Clouded futures, 427 Nature 207 (2004).   
44 The rate of new speciation, however, is exceedingly low -- a mere 3 species/year -- relative to the 
anticipated annual losses due to climate change. See J. John Sepkoski, Rates of speciation in the fossil 
record, 353 Phil. Trans. R. Soy. B 315 (1998).  
45 For examples of species that might benefit from climate change, see Johnston and Schmitz, supra note _. 
Even if some species benefit from climatic warming, current extinction rates -- even aside from climate 
change – far exceed baseline rates of new speciation. Substitution and replacement of animals or species 
thus will not proceed at a pace that implicates the social costs of climate change within a foreseeable 
timeframe. See Stuart L. Pimm et al, The Future of Biodiversity, 269 Science 347 (1995) and E.O. Wilson, 
Biophilia (1986).  
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animals will be affected by climate change. But more than with human beings, the harms 
to animals are already apparent, scientifically clear, and of first-order significance.  
 The question that remains is how to take account of this harm in policymaking. 
Some might be inclined to treat that harm as irrelevant. But that inclination would be 
extremely hard to defend in principle. On any plausible view, harm to animals matters, at 
least to some degree. This judgment is firmly reflected in American law. At the national 
level, the Endangered Species Act is complemented by the Animal Welfare Act, which is 
designed to protect a wide range of animals against suffering and premature death. Every 
state attempts to accomplish the same goal through anticruelty laws. We now turn to 
competing understandings of how, exactly, human societies should account for the 
interests of animals.  
 
III. Accounting for Animals 
 
 In sketching the effects of climate change, we have emphasized the loss of species 
as such. With this emphasis, we follow the scientific literature. But there are two separate 
interests here. The first is species loss; the second is the suffering and death of individual 
animals. Both are important, though not for the same reasons, and the second deserves 
independent attention. If 1,000 polar bears or tigers are condemned to extended periods 
of distress followed by premature death, their suffering and death would matter even if 
many polar bears and tigers remain.  
To be sure, the loss of a species is generally counted as an independent harm—in 
part because of the ecological and medicinal functions that species provide, in part 
because human beings want the opportunity to be able to see and enjoy biological 
diversity.46 As we shall see, human beings are willing to pay significant amounts to 
protect endangered species. But our broader interest here is in harms done to individual 
animals. Compare, for example, the loss of the last five harlequin frogs with the loss of 
1,000 polar bears. In our view, the latter loss is far worse, because it involves so much 
more in the way of suffering and death. More generally, we believe that much of social 
policy has been unduly focused on extinction to the neglect of the effects of individual 
                                                 
46 See, e.g., Gardner M. Brown and James F. Shogren, Economics of the Endangered Species Act, 12 J. 
Econ. Per. 3 (1998). 
10 
animals. From the moral point of view, threats to both endangered and nonendangered 
species should matter to climate change policy.  
 
A. Intrinsic and Instrumental Value 
 
The most straightforward reason to account for animals is that their interests are 
intrinsically important. A version of this view was held by Jeremy Bentham, who 
compared disregard for animal welfare to slavery. In 1789, the year of ratification of 
America’s Bill of Rights, Bentham argued47: 
 
“The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire 
those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the 
hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of 
the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without 
redress to the caprice of a tormentor. . . .  A full-grown horse or dog is 
beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, 
than an infant of a day, or a week, or even month, old. But suppose the 
case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they 
reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?” 
 
On Bentham’s view, utility is what matters, and because animals are capable of 
suffering, they deserve to count in the social calculus. Utilitarianism is of course highly 
controversial. Perhaps we should accept a form of welfarism,48 not tied to the contested 
metric of utility, or instead emphasize capabilities49 or even rights.50 We do not mean 
here to endorse any particular theory of why animal life matters. Whatever the proper 
account, it is widely agreed that the animals should count in the social calculus. On this 
point, there is an incompletely theorized agreement—an agreement in support of 
judgments and practices, amidst disagreement or uncertainty about what accounts for 
them.51 Millions of Americans treat their dogs and cats as beloved family members 
whose interests count independently of the interests of human beings. Many more agree 
that animal suffering should be reduced, even if there is no clear gain from such action to 
                                                 
47 Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 310-11 n1 (1988).   
48 See Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom (2001). 
49 See Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (2005). 
50 See Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1985) and Gary Francione, Your Child or the Dog? 
(2000).  
51 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996). 
11 
humans. Call this position the intrinsic value approach, because it seeks to protect animal 
welfare for its own sake, not because animals are a tool for the ends of human beings.  
 Of course, many human practices treat animals as worth little or nothing, or as 
solely of instrumental value. Consider, for example, the use of animals for food, and in 
particular the harm imposed on animals by factory farms—where chickens have their 
beaks seared off, cows and pigs are castrated without anesthetic, and veal calves are 
chained down in tiny crates for the duration of their short and miserable lives.52 In many 
contexts, animal life is valued only to the extent that human beings benefit from it. To be 
sure, social practices cannot dispose of the normative question. Bentham himself believed 
that the infliction of suffering is a prima facie wrong, not to be justified by its 
pervasiveness; and we agree with him. But many people continue to act as if some, most, 
or all animal life has largely or solely instrumental value, in a way that would raise 
questions about the extent of human responsibility for their deaths and suffering—
especially, perhaps, with respect to animals in distant lands. Even this view, however, 
acknowledges that animals can have value, sometimes significant value, and under the 
instrumental value approach, that value must be included in assessment of social policy. 
 
B. Monetary Valuation 
 
Whether or not animals are to be valued intrinsically or instrumentally, difficult 
issues remain. In the context of human life and health, American agencies assign 
monetary values on the basis of private “willingness to pay” (WTP).53 For example, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) values a human life at about $6.1 million, a 
figure that comes from real-world markets.54 Human life has intrinsic as well as 
instrumental value, and risks to human life can be monetized. In the workplace and for 
consumer goods, additional safety has a price; market evidence is investigated to identify 
that price. The $6.1 million figure, known as the value of a statistical life (VSL), is a 
product of studies of actual workplace risks, attempting to determine how much workers 
and others are paid to assume mortality hazards. Suppose that people must be paid $600, 
                                                 
52 See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (2001).  
53 See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
54 See Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value 
of Nothing (New York: The New Press, 2003). 
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on average, to eliminate risks of 1/10,000. If so, the VSL would be said to be $6 million. 
Where market evidence is unavailable, agencies often produce monetary valuations on 
the basis of contingent valuation surveys, which ask people how much they are willing to 
pay to eliminate or reduce certain risks. Drawing on market evidence and contingent 
valuation studies, the EPA has recently valued a case of chronic bronchitis at $260,000, 
an emergency hospital visit for asthma at $9,000, hospital admission for pneumonia at 
$13,400, a lost work-day at $83, and a specified decrease in visibility at $14.55 
Can similar tools be used to determine the value of a statistical life for animals? 
No labor markets are available to provide compensating differential studies of mortality 
risk. A contingent valuation study would be infeasible. Polar bears do not have money, 
and they cannot tell us how much they care about arctic sea ice. We might be tempted to 
apply existing market and contingent valuation studies to animals, valuing them at some 
fraction of human beings. But if so, an appropriate scaling factor would have to be 
determined, and any such factor might well seem arbitrary. What weight should a frog’s 
life or health have relative to that of a wolf, eagle, or human being? 
 An alternative approach is to value animals by reference to human preferences, 
turned into monetary equivalents. Economists typically make the relevant assessments by 
inquiring into use and non-use value—a division that corresponds closely to the 
distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value. Use value includes, for example, the 
ecosystem services provided by natural life (e.g., pollination by butterflies and bees); the 
value of biodiversity for agriculture and medical research; and the recreational value of 
observing natural wildlife. Non-use value reflects the pure “existence” value of animals 
or species (such as the value people place on simply knowing that some polar bears will 
survive) and the “option” value of knowing that animals, including some members of an 
endangered species, are available for future use. Neither use nor non-use value need be 
particularly controversial,56 even from the perspective of committed opponents of animal 
                                                 
55 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State 145 (American Bar Association: Washington, DC 2002). 
56 The idea of existence value raises several puzzles. For example, it makes the value of an animal or 
species depend on the human population size. If biological resources are conceived of as public goods that 
can be nonrivalrously consumed by many humans, however, this puzzle disappears. For discussion of other 
concerns with the concept of existence value, see David Dana, Existence Value and Federal Preservation 
Regulation, 28 Harv Envl Law Rev 343 (2003). 
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rights. If people care about animals and are willing to pay to protect them, then animals 
should matter for policy regardless of their moral status. 
 The economic approach to valuation of animals raises many questions. Is the 
value of animals, or species, adequately captured by human willingness to pay for their 
protection? Imagine a society in which existence value were effectively zero; we might 
well reject the moral judgments of the people in that society, and refuse to believe that 
those judgments should be the basis for policy and law. Those inclined to accept this 
objection might nonetheless agree that when it is positive, existence value will be 
included in the overall calculus. If people’s willingness to pay does not reflect the proper 
valuation of animals, it is not easy to identify the proper response. Perhaps the figures 
should result from processes of democratic deliberation, not from market evidence. But 
whatever its source, any monetary valuation of animals will inevitably be made by human 
beings. At the very least, we believe that use, existence, and option value, to the extent 
that they can be elicited, are a legitimate part of the climate change debate, and that they 
should be incorporated rather than neglected.  
Even if this conclusion is accepted, there are severe implementation difficulties in 
determining the relevant monetary values. As we shall see, serious efforts have been 
made to generate monetary figures for the use value of species. But when the use value of 
animals is a public good or commons, reliable market mechanisms are unavailable for 
translation into monetary benefits. For non-use value, the ordinary instrument consists of 
contingent valuation studies, and we shall make use of such studies here. But such studies 
raise many problems and, if not designed carefully, will produce implausible answers. In 
the climate change context, the possibility of small errors is especially important: when 
one is talking about millions of species, even miniscule changes in the species- or 
individual- level analysis will lead to dramatic changes in the estimated social value or 
cost.  
 Valuation difficulties of this sort, however, are not a reason for ignoring the 
relevant costs entirely, particularly when the stakes are large. And just as scientific 
uncertainty has been reduced over time, so too has the conceptual uncertainty about the 
accuracy of various methods of nonmarket valuation. If there is a gap in analysis of 
climate change and animals, it is a gap of the literature—and not the availability of 
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relevant facts or conceptual tools. Our initial submission is that losses of animal life 
should play a significant role in the debate. Let us attempt, then, to make some progress 
on the question of monetization.    
 
IV. The (Animal) Costs of Climate Change 
 
 We provide here a tentative estimate of some of the social welfare costs of climate 
change on nonhuman life, focusing on human valuations. Because of empirical and 
conceptual difficulties, we do not insist on any particular figures.57 Instead, we offer 
ranges designed to give a sense of the monetized value of merely one component of 
social loss: the loss of endangered species. The foregoing discussion should be enough to 
show that this loss cannot possibly capture the full value of harms to animals as a result 
of climate change. If suffering and death matter as such, animals that belong to 
nonendangered species matter as well, and the resulting losses will not be included in our 
analysis. But monetization of the loss of species presents the more tractable questions, 
because we have some information about the number of species at risk and human 
valuation of species loss. Our exclusion of animal death and suffering means that our 
ultimate figures will be far too low. 
We have two minimal goals, one substantive and the other methodological. The 
first is to show that the numbers are high, and that they need to be considered in assessing 
the losses from climate change. The second is to give a sense of some of the 
difficulties—normative, conceptual, and empirical—involved in assigning monetary 
values to those losses. 
 
A. Extinctions 
 
Our analysis focuses, in particular, on the 15–37% projected extinction rate noted 
above.58 Given the importance of this estimate, some discussion of its nature and 
plausibility is merited. Quantitative projections of the global impact of climate change are 
                                                 
57 Indeed, one of us is generally skeptical of cost-benefit analysis as a decision mechanism in 
environmental regulation; the other is a defender of considering the outcome of that analysis, without 
making it decisive. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason (2002). 
58 Thomas et al., supra note _. 
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necessarily difficult.59 This is true even of the impact on economic systems, where data is 
abundant. But it is even harder for natural systems. Human beings lack a clear measure of 
the number of species.60 Determining how each will be affected by climate change is thus 
a Herculean task. The approach used in extinction studies in biology focuses on generic 
species-area relationships (SAR) rather than specific causal mechanisms; the key 
assumption is that there is a systematic relationship between habitable area and survival. 
While this method has received some criticism,61 it is firmly established in the biological 
field.  
 The method can be applied to climate change because global warming has the 
effect of reducing the habitable area of most species. Using recently-released climate 
change data, Thomas and his coauthors determine “climate envelopes”—climatic 
conditions under which particular species can survive—and predict how changes to these 
envelopes reduce effective habitat size. While the climatic stress for any particular animal 
in any particular year is small, the yearly and global accumulation of habitat loss leads to 
massive long-run consequences. If human beings impose a small stress on the habitat of 
every animal on the planet, but do so every year over a period of many decades, many of 
them will eventually die off.  
 There are, however, potential problems with our use of the extinction projections 
from Thomas and his coauthors, and these should be noted at the outset. First, there is the 
question of representativeness.62 The 1,103 species examined by Thomas and his 
coauthors—while an immense, joint scientific endeavor—nonetheless represent a 
miniscule portion of the total number of species. The 20% of the terrestrial Earth sampled 
by this study, moreover, might not accurately reflect the other 80%. But in the absence of 
good reasons to think that generalization is flawed, reliance on such methods is plausible. 
                                                 
59 See Pounds and Puschendorf, supra note _.  
60 See J.E.M. Baillie et al, 2004 IUCN Red List of Threatened Species: A Global Species Assessment 
(2004).  
61 See Lomborg, supra note _, at 251-257 and Owen T. Lewis, Climate change, species-area curves and the 
extinction crisis, 361 Phil. Trans. R. Soy. B 163 (2006).  
62 See Laddle, supra note _.  
16 
If we are to make some assumption about the expected losses, better to use the best 
available figure—representativeness concerns notwithstanding—than no figure at all.63 
 Second, and even more fundamentally, the 15–37% extinction rate gives us no 
information about the number or distribution of species, or the total number of animals at 
risk. This information is vital to a sound analysis, because the absolute number (and 
neurological characteristics) of creatures matters a great deal, whether intrinsic or 
instrumental value is emphasized. Human beings are undoubtedly willing to spend more 
to save some species than to save others. In addition, they are more willing to save large 
numbers of animals than small numbers. Our own treatment pays no attention to species-
specific characteristics (which might bias our findings upwards or downwards), or to the 
absolute numbers of organisms (rather than species)—a serious omission on both fronts.  
More specific information, however, is difficult to come by. Approximately 1.55 
million species have been described and counted to date, but many more remain 
undiscovered.64 Projections of the total number of species range from 5–50 million,65 
with a recent study suggesting that an even lower figure—less than 5 million—is 
possible.66 In terms of taxonomic distribution, vertebrates comprise a comparatively tiny 
57,739 of the 1.55 million known species. The vast majority of species are arthropods—
which are a small portion of the Thomas sample (79 of 1,103 species, 69 of which are 
butterfly species). Finally, the absolute number of animals is virtually impossible to 
estimate; it is difficult to estimate population sizes of species that are not known to exist! 
To say the least, uncertainty of this sort is important.  
A third problem with the 15–37% figure is that it provides no guidance as to the 
timing of extinctions. If we are speaking about human valuations, losing polar bears 
tomorrow would presumably be worse than losing them a hundred years from now.67 But 
                                                 
63 A recent study published in Nature suggests that global patterns of species richness are highly correlated 
across taxons, suggesting representativeness concerns may not be very significant. See John F. Lamoreux, 
et al., Global tests of biodiversity concordance and the importance of endemism, 440 Nature 212 (2006).  
64 Baillie, et al, supra note _, 7.  
65 See Robert M. May, How many species are there on Earth?, 247 Science 1441 (1988).  
66 Vojtech Novotny, et al, Low host specificity of herbivorous insects in a tropical forest, 416 Nature 841 
(2002).  
67 There is a significant debate, however, as to whether discounting is appropriate when it comes to human 
health and life. Presumably, critics would be equally concerned about animal life. See Lisa Heinzerling, 
Discounting Life, 108 Yale LJ 1911 (1999); Symposium, University of Chicago Law Review, forthcoming 
2007. 
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the SAR models do not estimate the date of extinction but instead its inevitability. A 
predicted extinction thus might occur tomorrow, in 2050, or 2100.  
Fortunately, the estimation methods we use below partially account for this 
chronological uncertainty. (The exception is the “use” value estimate, which we discuss 
below.) For example, the CV results we rely on ask individuals how much they value the 
prevention of a negative change in a threatened species’ population, rather than 
immediate extinction. Similarly, the ESA expenditures we use for our “revealed 
preference” analysis are incurred to prevent population losses and risks of extinction in 
the future. If we conceive of the Thomas extinction rates as probabilistic risks that are 
imposed today, and find monetary measures that reflect risk rather than immediate 
extinction, then the discounting problem fades in importance. If, for example, people are 
now willing to pay $20 to reduce a 1/10,000 risk that will come to fruition in twenty 
years, then the resulting figure can be used without discounting. 
Fourth, and as we have emphasized, extinction rates ignore the death and 
suffering of creatures that do not go extinct. This will serve to bias our estimates 
downward, and significantly so. Warming of polar waters will have severe consequences 
for polar bears, even if it does not lead to extinction. An effort to calculate human use and 
non-use value would take account of the relevant losses, to the extent that people cared 
about polar bear suffering independent of extinction risk. Global estimates of the 
suffering caused by climate change, however, are even harder to come by than death 
estimates.68 Such estimates would require close observation of every species—certainly 
not possible when most species have not even been identified. 
Fifth and finally, the SAR models do not fully account for the expected costs of 
extreme weather events69 or abrupt climate change. Again, this will only serve to bias our 
results downward.  
The upshot of this discussion is that, while there are significant problems in using 
the Thomas extinction measure, it is a useful foundation for our analysis. If we can obtain 
                                                 
68 Correspondence with Prof. Chris D. Thomas, University of York (June 2, 2006).  
69 Extreme weather related to differences in mean temperature, e.g., heat waves, are accounted for. The 
Thomas model does not, however, account for possible increases in storm activity, year-to-year 
temperature variance, and other changes in climate extremes.  See Thomas, supra note _.  
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a monetary value from that measure, it will at least identify a component of the social 
loss from climate change.  
 
B. Three Assumptions 
 
 Before proceeding to our estimates, we describe three additional assumptions. 
First, we rely on a low-end assumption regarding the total number of species—5 
million—throughout. (This is half the minimum number cited by Lomborg, for 
example.70) This figure provides a conservative baseline for evaluating the impact of 
climate change. The implication is that anywhere from .75–1.85 million species will be 
lost under climate change scenarios for 2050.  
 Second, for calculations that are sensitive to taxonomic distribution, we assume 
that all vertebrate species have been identified. Under this assumption, the 57,739 figure 
cited above exhausts the universe of vertebrate species. The alternative assumption is that 
vertebrates comprise the same portion of unknown as known species. This would 
increase the estimate of vertebrate species from 57,739 to around 186,000. The real 
number of vertebrate species is somewhere between these two figures but probably much 
closer to the former, as vertebrate species are more likely to be currently identified.71 In 
order to avoid speculation in an area in which biologists have little information, we 
conservatively assume that the 57,739 figure is correct. Relying on the 15–37% 
extinction rate, we thus estimate that anywhere from 8,700–21,400 vertebrates eventually 
will be lost under climate change scenarios for 2050.72 
 Finally, we assume a linear individual and social value function for species loss in 
all estimates. If we are valuing animals for their own sake, i.e. intrinsically, then 
presumably each animal should count for approximately the same amount as the last.73 
On the other hand, the correct value or cost function for instrumental value might be 
                                                 
70 See Lomborg, supra note _.  
71 See Baillie, supra note _, at 8. 
72 We assume that the extinction rate for fish will be similar to the extinction rates for other vertebrates. 
Due to data limitations, Thomas et all examined only terrestrial vertebrate species; the impact of climate 
change on fish and other aquatic life, however, is not thought to be fundamentally divergent. See, for 
example,  Catherine M. O’Reilly, et al, Climate change decreases aquatic ecosystem productivity of Lake 
Tanganyika, Africa, 424 Nature 733 (2003) and Allison L. Perry, et al, Climate Change and Distribution 
Shifts in Marine Fishes, 308 Science 1912 (2005).  
73 There might be different population sizes across species, of course, but as noted previously, data on 
population sizes is hard to come by.   
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concave or convex in species loss rather than linear. Concavity would imply diminishing 
marginal utility for species protection. For example, if we conceive of species protection 
as a consumption good, we might decide, after spending money to protect polar bears and 
ring ouzels, that protecting harlequin frogs “just isn’t worth as much.” Some 
experimental findings suggest that species protection is a “warm glow” good—that 
individuals will pay a fixed amount, and only that fixed amount, to “be part of a good 
cause” regardless of the expected consequences.74 Convexity, in contrast, would imply 
increasing marginal costs for species loss. If we conceive of species loss as a social harm, 
losing one species might not harm us much—and might not elicit a high marginal 
willingness to pay—but losing the millionth species would leave us in a biological 
wasteland.  It is unclear which effect should dominate, but we follow a default 
assumption of linearity. Ideally, contingent value surveys should be able to capture the 
curvature of the value or cost function, if any, but no studies to date that we are aware of 
have engaged in this line of research.    
 
C. Estimates 
 
 We now proceed to our estimation analysis. We report values in two ways: by 
2005 US dollars and by percentage of GDP. The two measures have independent 
significance. The former assumes that real willingness to pay will remain static in 
perpetuity. The latter implies that species protection will remain a fixed proportion of 
GDP; that is, as income grows, willingness to pay will grow exactly proportionately. Our 
own hunch is that species protection, like health and environmental protection more 
generally, will comprise an increasing portion of GDP, both because species protection is 
likely to be a “luxury good” (i.e., we will spend proportionately more on it as our wealth 
increases), and because species protection becomes more valuable as more species go 
extinct. If that is true, then both of our reporting methods will underestimate true social 
costs.   
 
                                                 
74 See Tol, supra note _ at 54-55.  
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1. Use Value Estimates 
 
Ecosystems provide immense value for human use. The air we breathe, the soil 
we farm, the plants we harvest, and the water we drink, all depend on ecosystem services. 
A significant portion of this value is generated by biological sources. 
Two recent studies have estimated the value of natural systems for human use. 
First, a 1997 study published in Nature estimated the total (and largely nonmarket) annual 
value of ecosystem services to be around $33 trillion—around twice the value of global 
GDP at the time.75 Not all of this is generated by biological sources, but the aggregate 
value is broken down by categories, such as food production, gas and climate regulation, 
water supply, and raw materials.  
 Previous studies of climate change have accounted for at least some of this value. 
For example, virtually every study of climate change has examined its impact on food 
production. The categories relating to natural biological processes, however, have been 
ignored in climate change analysis. And at least four of these categories—pollination, 
biological control, habitat/refugia, and genetic resources—are comprised entirely of 
natural biological sources.  
 
Table 1: Value of Biological Ecosystem Services to the World 
Categories Dollars ($US 2005, billions) 
Pollination 154 
Biological Control 550 
Habitat/Refugia 164 
Genetic Resources 104 
World Total 973 
U.S. Total 280 
Source: Robert Costanza et al, The value of the world’s ecosystem 
services and natural capital, 387 Nature 253 (1997). 
 
 Summing these four, we obtain an annual value of biological services of $973 
billion in 2005 dollars, for the world. Using the Thomas extinction estimate of 15–37%, 
the projected loss from climate change is thus $146–360 billion in annual value. 
Excluding habitat/refugia—which is arguably a “non-use” value—the summed value is 
$809 billion in 2005 dollars, and the projected loss range is $121–299 billion. If we 
                                                 
75 Robert Costanza et al, The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital, 387 Nature 253 
(1997). 
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assume that the United States receives a proportion of this use value equal to its 
proportion of 2005 global GDP, the projected loss for the U.S. alone ranges from $42–
103 billion ($35–86 billion if habitat/refugia is excluded) annually, or anywhere from 
0.4–1.1% of annual US GDP (0.4–0.9% if habitat/refugia is excluded).76  
This figure underestimates the true use value of nonhuman life because many 
categories of eco-system services—e.g., erosion control, soil formation, and nutrient 
cycling—are of mixed biological and nonbiological origin.  
The second study we use, published in Bioscience in 1997, avoids this under-
inclusion problem by breaking down the value of all ecosystem services (including 
services of mixed biological/nonbiological origin, such as soil formation) to which 
biological sources contribute.77 The reported annual value of biodiversity for the U.S. is 
$389 billion in 2005 dollars, and $3,572 billion for the world.  
 
Table 2: Value of Biodiversity to the U.S. and the World 
Categories U.S., Dollars ($US 2005, billions) 
World, Dollars 
($US 2005, billions) 
Waste Disposal 75.6 927.2 
Soil Formation 6.1 30.5 
Nitrogen Fixation 9.8 109.8 
Bioremediation of Chemicals 27.5 147.6 
Crop Breeding (Genetics) 24.4 140.3 
Livestock Breeding (Genetics) 24.4 48.8 
Biotechnology 3.1 7.3 
Biocontrol of Pests (Crops) 14.6 122 
Biocontrol of Pests (Forests) 6.1 73.2 
Host Plant Resistance (Crops) 9.8 97.6 
Host Plant Resistance (Forests) 1 13.4 
Perennial Grains (Potential) 20.7 207.4 
Pollination 48.8 244 
Fishing 35.4 73.2 
Hunting 14.6 30.5 
Seafood 3.1 100 
Other Wild Foods 0.6 219.6 
                                                 
76 All economic statistics are drawn from the Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product 
Account Tables, available at <http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/index.asp>. The exception is US share 
of global GDP, which is taken from the CIA World Factbook, available at 
<https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>. U.S. GDP percentages are calculated with 
reference to the year of the study.  
77 Daniel Pimentel et al, Economic and Environmental Benefits of Biodiversity, 47 BioScience 747 (1997).  
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Table 2: Value of Biodiversity to the U.S. and the World (continued) 
Categories U.S., Dollars ($US 2005, billions) 
World, Dollars 
($US 2005, billions) 
Wood Products 9.8 102.5 
Ecotourism 22 610 
Pharmaceuticals from Plants 24.4 102.5 
Forests sequestering of Carbon Dioxide 7.3 164.7 
Total 389.2 3572.1 
Source: Daniel Pimentel et al, Economic and Environmental Benefits of Biodiversity, 47 BioScience 747 
(1997). 
  
Here, no exclusion is necessary for our estimate, since all of these values are from 
biological sources. The projected loss from climate change is $58–144 billion, or 0.6–
1.4% of GDP, in annual value for the U.S.—surprisingly close to the estimate suggested 
by the Costanza et al study—and $539–1,322 billion for the world. Our estimates are 
summarized in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Loss in Annual Biodiversity Use Value for the U.S. 
  
World Value
($US 2005, 
billions) 
U.S. Value 
($US 2005, 
billions) 
U.S. Percent 
GDP 
Costanza Low Climate Change 121 35 0.4 
 High Climate Change 299 86 0.9 
 Low Climate Change (including Refugia) 146 42 0.4 
 High Climate Change (including Refugia) 360 103 1.1 
Pimentel  Low Climate Change 539 58 0.6 
 High Climate Change 1322 144 1.4 
Note: best estimate in bold. “Low” and “high” refer to low and high end climate change scenarios for 
2050. See note _. 
 
2. Use Value Objections 
 
Three implicit assumptions of our analysis might be challenged. First, we assume 
that, in ex ante expectation, threatened species will not systematically differ in use value 
from nonthreatened species. It might be argued, in contrast, that valuable species tend to 
be more durable, or more adapted to human society, and thus less susceptible to damage 
from climate change. It seems rather unlikely that dogs or cats will be among the species 
extinguished by global warming. 
While a full empirical defense of this assumption would require an inquiry 
beyond the scope of this paper, we believe our assumption is at least plausible. First, we 
have no reason to suspect that value has any inherent correlation with durability or 
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survivability. Second, value need not imply adaptation to human society; indeed, many 
currently endangered species, such as some varieties of salmon and sturgeon, have been 
over-used to threatened status precisely because of their value. 
Second, and as noted above, we assume a linear value function. That is, the first 
generic species lost is no more or less valuable, from an ex ante perspective, than the last. 
Thus, a 10% loss in species implies a 10% loss in biological use value. Some 
commentary, in contrast, has suggested that the biodiversity use value is concave because 
of redundancies in biological resources.78 The value of biodiversity, under this view, is 
not heavily affected by a particular species loss, so long as there are biologically and 
genetically similar organisms that are not lost, i.e. the “genetic distance” between lost and 
surviving species is small. For example, we might not care much about the first 109 
species of harlequin frog, if we know that the 110th will survive. 
We have three responses to this objection. First, if threats to biologically similar 
organisms are correlated, as is surely the case, redundancy need not make the value 
function concave over its entire domain, but rather simply discrete (e.g., a stepwise 
function, that increases or decreases only at certain threshold points). So long as we 
expect one class of organisms is no more or less valuable than the next class, the linear 
approximation will be valid. Second, more recent commentary has challenged the 
“genetic distance” approach to valuing biodiversity because redundancy serves an 
insurance-like function against catastrophic loss. For example, if some pathogen attacks 
harlequin frogs, we will be better off with 110 species than 1, since the 110 species will 
be more likely to have some adaptive characteristic that will allow it to survive the 
threat.79 More generally, the fact that two species are very similar need not make them 
redundant in value, if the small differences serve some vital function.  Finally, to the 
extent that species are ecologically interdependent, protection of one species will be 
                                                 
78 See Gardner M. Brown and James F. Shogren, Economics of the Endangered Species Act, 12 J. Econ. 
Per. 3 (1998); Martin Weitzman, On Diversity, 107 Quarterly Journal of Economics 363 (1992); and 
Stephen Polasky and Andrew R. Solow, On the Value of a Collection of Species, 29 Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 298 (1993). 
79 See William A. Brock and Anastasios Xepapadeas, Valuing Biodiversity from an Economic Perspective: 
A Unified Economic, Ecological, and Genetic Approach, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1597 (2003). 
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required to protect many others.80 However, if our assumption here is wrong, our figure 
must be diminished accordingly. 
A third implicit assumption in our analysis is that there is no adaptive response 
possible when a particular species is threatened. It might be argued, in contrast, that once 
a valuable species is threatened, human society will act in an ad hoc fashion to prevent its 
loss.  The difficulty with this argument is that damage from climate change, unlike other 
human-caused environmental damage, is hard to mitigate on a case by case basis. The 
harlequin frogs discussed in the introduction provide an example a species where 
mitigation strategies have proven futile.81 Protecting habitat from human intrusion does 
little good if climate change has already undermined the viability of a creature’s habitat. 
And creating a biosphere or zoo for the world, with controlled environments, would seem 
prohibitively costly. 
There are three other major sources of error in our estimates. First, we have failed 
to account for chronological uncertainty about species extinction. This is inevitable since, 
as noted above, the SAR models provide no guidance as to the timing of extinctions. If a 
species goes extinct in 2100, the loss in use value will be significantly less than if it goes 
extinct in 2007. Suppose, as seems plausible, that most of the extinctions will occur later 
rather than earlier. If so, the use of a standard discount rate—say, 3%—will significantly 
decrease the monetary figures above. On the other hand, the use of the standard discount 
rate is contested, and it is by no means clear that it ought to be used.82  
Second, our absolute value estimates ignore the possibility that improved 
technology will either reduce or amplify the value of biodiversity. Both reduction and 
amplification are possible. If synthetic substitutes are found, perhaps biodiversity will be 
less important than it now is. On the other hand, the progress of genetic research may 
mean that we will find more and more valuable uses for biological resources.83 The GDP 
measures simply assume that use value will grow in the same proportion as the other 
components of GDP—so that a 1% loss today implies a 1% loss in 2050.  
                                                 
80 See Pimentel, supra note _. 
81 See Pounds, et al, supra note _.  
82 See Ackerman and Finlayson, supra note. 
83 See, for example, Paulo Prada, Poisonous Tree Frog Could Bring Wealth to Tribe in Brazilian Amazon, 
N.Y. Times, May 30, 2006, at C1.  
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Third and finally, we assume that extinction is the only harm to global 
biodiversity. In reality, if 90% of a species’ population is reduced, this will undermine 
use value nearly as much as extinction.  
The first of these three errors suggests overestimation; the second suggests 
possible over-estimation and possible underestimation; the third suggests 
underestimation. For this reason, we lack confidence in our particular figures. The only 
unambiguous conclusion is that the costs of climate change will be seriously 
underestimated if account is not taken of the use value of biological resources.  
 
3. Non-use Value 
 
We offer two strategies for estimation of non-use value. First, we use contingent 
valuation studies of threatened species to estimate the monetized welfare costs of species 
loss from climate change. As we shall see, this estimation strategy runs into exceedingly 
serious problems, and one of our goals is to explain those problems. Second, we use 
expenditures on the ESA as a “revealed preference” measure of species value. Under both 
strategies we offer a range of estimates based on differing assumptions about the 
appropriate valuation method.  
 
a. Contingent Valuation: Foundations 
 
 Contingent valuation studies directly elicit willingness to pay through surveys that 
develop a hypothetical market for public goods.84 Survey participants are given detailed 
information about the resource in question, as well as the nature of the proposed 
protection. They are also informed of the consequences of protective inaction—suffering, 
population loss, extinction, and so forth. In some instances, WTP is determined through 
open-ended inquiry; in others, respondents are given a discrete set of payment choices, or 
even a single referendum-style yes/no choice for a specified dollar amount.  
The virtue of the contingent valuation method is that it provides a direct measure 
of human valuation and avoids the potential circularity of using revealed preferences, as 
based on existing regulatory practices. When the question is “What amount should be 
                                                 
84 For an overview of CV methodology, see Robert C. Mitchell and Richard T. Carson, Using Surveys to 
Value Public Goods: The Contingent Valuation Method (1988).  
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spent to protect animals?” it might seem most sensible to elicit people’s judgments, and 
not to rely on current regulatory expenditures. The current expenditures might very well 
be too low, because of collective action problems in political action, or too high, because 
of interest group pressures. On the other hand, contingent valuation methods might be 
problematic because of “protest” valuations, framing problems, or other cognitive 
defects.85  
 Even with these concerns, a well-designed contingent valuation study may turn 
out to be the best or only available method for measuring non-use values.86 In the area of 
species loss, two major contingent valuation surveys have examined individual 
willingness to pay. The first, by Pearce, provides values for ten major threatened species, 
using seven source studies.87 
 
Table 4: Contingent Value of Species Protection (Pearce) 
Species Annual Value per Person ($US 2005) 
Bald Eagle 18.48 
Emerald Shiner 6.71 
Grizzly Bear 27.57 
Bighorn Sheep 12.81 
Whooping Crane 1.79 
Blue Whale 13.86 
Bottlenose Dolphin 10.43 
Sea Otter 12.07 
Northern Elephant Seal 12.07 
Humpback Whale 65.56 
Total 181.33 
Per Species 18.13 
Total (No Humpback) 115.77 
Per Species (No Humpback) 12.86 
 
 A more recent study, by Loomis and White, surveyed twenty contingent valuation 
studies and provides values for seventeen threatened species.88 Where multiple estimates 
                                                 
85 For potential problems with the CV method, see Daniel Kahneman and Jack L. Knetsch, Valuing Public 
Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction, 22 J. Env. Econ. & Man. 57 (1992); Peter A. Diamond and 
Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number better than No Number?, 8 J. Econ. Per. 45 
(1994); Daniel McFadden, Contingent Valuation and Social Choice, 76 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 689 (1994); 
and Jerry A. Hausman ed., Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment (1993).  
86 David W. Pearce, Economics Values and the Natural World (1993). 
87 Pearce, supra note _.   
88 John B. Loomis and Douglas S. White, Economic analysis of rare and endangered species, 18 Ecological 
Economics 197 (1996).  
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for a species are provided by Loomis, we use the average value. We also convert 
Loomis/White’s reports of one-time, lump-sum valuation into annual values (using a .10 
discount rate), for the purpose of making apples to apples comparisons in our analysis.  
 
Table 5: Contingent value of species protection (Loomis and White) 
 
Species 
Annual Value 
per Household
($US 2005) 
Annual Value 
per Person  
($US 2005) 
Arctic Grayling/Cutthroat Trout 2.03 0.79 
Atlantic Salmon 10.80 4.20 
Bald Eagle 32.40 12.61 
Bighorn Sheep 28.35 11.03 
Gray Wolf 9.05 3.52 
Grey Whale 35.10 13.66 
Grizzly Bears 62.10 24.16 
Humpback Whale 23.36 9.09 
Monk Seal 16.20 6.30 
Northern Spotted Owl 94.50 36.77 
Pacific Salmon/Steelhead 85.05 33.09 
Red-Cockaded Woodpecker 17.55 6.83 
Sea Otter 39.15 15.23 
Sea Turtle 17.55 6.83 
Squawfish 10.80 4.20 
Striped Shiner 8.10 3.15 
Whooping Crane 47.25 18.39 
Total 539.33 209.85 
Per Species 31.73 12.34 
 
 One striking fact about these two surveys is that they imply per species valuations 
that are relatively similar. Dividing the per household measure from Loomis/White by the 
average size of a household (2.57)89 leads to a per species estimate of approximately 
$12.34 per person annually—compared to the $18 per person measure from Pearce. 
Moreover, if the humpback whale outlier is removed from the Pearce survey, as Pearce 
himself suggests ought to be done, his survey’s average drops to $12.86 per person—
virtually identical to the $12.34 Loomis/White result. While there is some overlap in the 
CV source studies surveyed by Pearce and Loomis/White,90 the fact that per species 
estimates are similar in magnitude, and not extremely sensitive to the particular species 
                                                 
89 Average size of household is taken from the 2005 Current Population Survey, US Census Bureau, 
available at http://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm.  
90 Three of the seven surveys used by Pierce are also used by Loomis/White.  
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surveyed, is a comforting feature of the data. CV methods seem to be arriving at 
consistent average values.  
 On the other hand, there are also some troubling irregularities. For example, the 
whooping crane is valued at $1.79 in Pearce, but an order of magnitude more ($18.39 per 
person) in Loomis/White. Similarly, the estimated values in both studies exceed the 
amounts actually expended by respondents on conservation.91 This fact, however, is as 
consistent with a collective action problem hypothesis as it is with an erroneous 
methodology. Finally, there is a strong possibility of reporting bias: researchers are 
probably more likely to conduct surveys for high-value than for low-value species. 
Indeed, two of the twenty-one species surveyed (steelhead, and the red-cockaded 
woodpecker) are among the ten most costly species in 2004 ESA expenditures.  
 One final note should be made about this data. The studies surveyed by Pearce 
and Loomis/White offer a variety of different population change scenarios in their 
queries. For example, many of the surveys were framed in terms of a gain to an 
endangered population, rather than avoidance of extinction.92 In contrast, our analysis 
assumes that all elicited valuations are tied to extinction. Since valuations for extinction 
would presumably be higher than valuations for population loss or gain without 
extinction, our estimates of the cost of climate change will be biased downward.93  
 
b. Contingent Value: Estimates 
 
 We now proceed to our estimation analysis. We merge the Pearce and 
Loomis/White data, using mean values where species are examined in both studies, to 
arrive at an annual per person willingness to pay of $11.84 annually for a generic 
species.94 The obvious way to use this data is to multiply total social willingness to pay to 
protect a species by expected species loss—.75–1.85 million species. Using 2000 Census 
population figures, this leads to an astronomical range estimate of $2,499–6,164 trillion 
in annual costs for the U.S.! Of course this number should not be trusted. The most 
                                                 
91 See Pearce, supra note _, at 75.  
92 Moreover, the enhanced valuation of losses relative to gains is one of the central findings of behavioral 
economics. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under 
Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979).  
93 Only 17 of the 43 total queries were framed in terms of extinction loss. See Loomis and White, supra 
note _, at 200, 201.   
94 We exclude the humpback whale outlier, as suggested by Pearce. 
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obvious reason is that the vast majority of the .75-1.85 million species anticipated to be 
lost due to climate change are arthropods (e.g., insects). In contrast, the contingent 
valuation studies generally focus on vertebrates such as mammals and birds. Presumably, 
most people will value vertebrate species more highly than, say, butterflies and beetles.  
 An alternative estimation method would thus exclude all nonvertebrate species, 
on the assumption that human beings are not willing to pay anything for them. With that 
exclusion, the threatened loss is 8,700–21,400 species. The range estimate drops 
considerably but is still extremely high—$29–71 trillion in annual costs, or anywhere 
from 3–7 times annual GDP. This number also raises serious difficulties; would U.S. 
citizens be willing to pay multiples of their current income to protect any number of 
species? 
 It seems, probable, therefore, that we face a problem of reporting bias: species 
examined by CV surveys might not be representative of species that are not. We adjust 
our estimate for this possibility in the following way. First, we determine a mean ESA 
expenditure for the fifteen domestic endangered species in our surveys. We then debias 
our estimate, by using ESA expenditures as a baseline. The key assumption underlying 
this method is that the distribution of ESA expenditures across species roughly captures 
the distribution of social value. Table 6 provides the species-specific expenditure data.  
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Table 6: ESA expenditures on surveyed species 
Species ESA Expenditures ($US 2005, thousands) 
Atlantic Salmon 7496 
Bald Eagle 9837 
Bighorn Sheep 714 
Blue Whale 67 
Gray Wolf 6662 
Grizzly Bears 7742 
Humpback Whale 666 
Monk Seal 2321 
Northern Spotted Owl 6980 
Pacific Salmon/Steelhead 117380 
Red-Cockaded Woodpecker 14125 
Sea Otter 734 
Sea Turtle 28868 
Squawfish 5732 
Whooping Cranes 1757 
Total 211081 
Average 14072.07 
Total (Excluding Steelhead) 93701 
Average (Excluding Steelhead) 6693 
Average (All Species in ESA)95 592 
Bias Factor (Excluding Steelhead) 11.3 
 
 An obvious outlier in this data is the pacific salmon/steelhead, which at $117 
million exceeds the next highest species by an order of magnitude. In contrast, the CV 
data shows that the steelhead is valued highly—the second highest in our sample—but 
certainly not as highly as suggested by its ESA expenditures. We thus drop the steelhead 
in our analysis.  
Excluding the steelhead, the bias multiple we calculate is 11.3. That is, the 
representative species from our sample is approximately 11.3 times more valuable than 
the mean endangered species. Dividing our estimates of the harm of climate change by 
this value leads us to a revised cost range from $2.6–6.3 trillion in annual value, or 
anywhere from 27–66% of GDP. Our results are summarized in Table 7.  
 
                                                 
95 The average here differs from the average ESA cost reported below because we exclude non species-
specific expenditures.  
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Table 7: Total Contingent Value of Species Loss ($US 2005, Trillions) 
 Low Climate Change High Climate Change 
Estimated Costs 2499 6164 
Estimated Costs (Vertebrates Only) 29 71 
Estimated Costs (Vertebrates Only, Adjusted for 
Reporting Bias)  2.6 6.3 
%GDP 27% 66% 
Note: %GDP is calculated relative to 1995 baseline (the year of the Loomis study) from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis National Income Tables.  
 
Even these adjusted estimates should be taken with many grains of salt. As noted 
above, CV methods are plagued by various anomalies. Perhaps most important is what 
Kahneman and Knetsch describe as the “embedding effect”—the tendency for elicited 
valuations to remain relatively similar across surveys, even where theory would predict 
dramatic differences in WTP.96 One manifestation of this effect is the insensitivity of 
valuations to the size of a prospective harm; surveys often elicit similar values from 
respondents, whether 1, 10, or 100 of a particular good are the subject of inquiry.97 If a 
CV survey were commissioned to examine popular WTP for ten species, it might very 
well obtain values identical to the value we use for a single species. This, of course, 
would greatly undermine our linear aggregation method.   
For this reason, we do not believe that our estimate accurately captures human 
valuations, even in a first best world where collective action problems are eliminated. To 
say the least, people are most unlikely to devote nearly all of GDP, and much less a 
multiple of GDP, to the protection of nonhuman life. Individuals would not follow their 
initial inclination when they see the total bill. Opponents of CV will see our results as 
confirming evidence for the implausibility of the method. Advocates will urge more 
careful and contextually-sensitive inquiries.  
We offer a third possibility: instead of interpreting the CV results as actual 
willingness to pay, we might instead understand them as clues to individuals’ intuitions 
about the intrinsic value of nonhuman life, i.e. the welfare of animals for its own sake. 
Surely human society would pay many multiples of GDP to prevent human extinction. 
And some surveys suggest that individuals value foreign human suffering by an order of 
                                                 
96 See Kahneman and Knetsch, supra note _.  
97 See William H. Desvouges et al, Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests 
of Validity and Reliability 91-164, in Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 
1993) 
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magnitude more than the U.S. actually expends.98 The fact that the United States does not 
spend as much as people state they would prefer for such causes—whether human or 
nonhuman—does not necessarily undermine the elicited figure as a normative matter, 
even if it does undermine it as a descriptive matter.  
In short, at this point, our conclusion is lamentably vague: Americans are willing 
to spend a great deal to protect endangered species—and hence nonuse value, once 
properly monetized, is quite large.  
 
c.. Revealed Preference 
 
 An alternative and less troublesome strategy for estimating non-use value is to use 
data on current ESA expenditures to protect threatened animals. A significant advantage 
of this data is that it reduces the problem just mentioned—that is, the aggregate figure is 
alert to a budget constraint, and in that sense it is much more realistic than a figure that 
emerges from aggregating willingness to pay for each individual species, taken one at a 
time.  
Federal and state government expenditures on the ESA in 2004 were 
approximately $1.4 billion to protect 1340 entities.99 (“Entity” and “species” have 
slightly different meanings in the ESA, but the differences are not significant for the 
purposes of our analysis.100) In contrast, in 1994, nominal expenditures were only $245 
million. While part of the reason for this vast jump is the use of a different, and more 
expansive, measure for expenditures starting in 2001,101 there is nonetheless a clear and 
steady trend of increased expenditures over the past decade. The seven-year period from 
1994–2000 saw an approximately 150% nominal increase; the period from 2002–04 
                                                 
98  In a poll of Americans preferences for foreign aid in the federal budget, Stephen Kull found that the 
mean response was 14%. In fact, the federal government devotes less than 1% of its budget to aid. See 
Stephen Kull, Americans on Foreign Aid and World Hunger, Program on International Policy Attitudes, 
available at <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/btdevelopmentaidra/>.  
99 The operational categories for expenditures at the Fish and Wildlife Service include fisheries, refuge, 
land acquisition, law enforcement, research, listing, and consultation, among others. State agencies do not 
have the same formal categories, but undertake similar activity. See Fish and Wildlife Service, supra note 
_, at 3.  
100 “Entity” is a more narrow category than “species,”  so a single species might be represented by multiple 
entities in the endangered species list. The per species values we report, therefore, will be underestimates. 
See Fish and Wildlife Service, supra note _.  
101 In particular, nonspecific expenditures were recorded beginning in 2001. See Fish and Wildlife Service, 
supra note _.  
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(under the new measure of expenditures) saw an approximate 19% increase. (The year 
2001 was an outlier in the general trend, with $2.4 billion in expenditures.) 
 Part of the reason for this expenditure trend is an increase in the number of listed 
species. In 1994, there were 914 listed organisms—there was thus a 47% increase in 
listed endangered or threatened species over the examined period. The per-species 
average, however, has jumped far more than 47%—from $.27 million per species in 1994 
to $1.05 million in 2004, a 290% increase. There are at least two economic explanations 
for this increase: first, as social wealth increases, demand for species protection will 
increase, especially if environmental protection is a “luxury” good; second, as more 
species go extinct, preservation of a marginal species might be deemed of higher 
importance. It is also possible, of course, that the increase is simply the result of interest 
group politics.102  
 
Table 8: Federal and state expenditures on ESA (nominal dollars) 
Year Expenditures (Millions) Listed Entities 
Per Species Average 
(Millions) 
1994 245 914 0.27 
1995 298 957 0.31 
1996 286 963 0.30 
1997 301 1111 0.27 
1998 454 1166 0.39 
1999 514 1202 0.43 
2000 610 1235 0.49 
2001 2442 1272 1.92 
2002 1192 1285 0.93 
2003 1201 1335 0.90 
2004 1412 1340 1.05 
Source: Fish and Wildlife Service, Federal and State Endangered and 
Threatened Species Expenditures: Fiscal Year 2004. 
 
 The expenditure data can be used directly to estimate a social cost for species loss 
from climate change. (Note that we are dealing here with the costs to Americans alone, 
which will bias our estimates downward.) Current expenditures on endangered species 
                                                 
102 Public choice dynamics, however, could cut in the other direction as well. Widespread but relatively 
weak preferences generally lead to collective action problems in public good provision. See Mancur Olson, 
The Logic of Collective Action (1971). If collective action problems in protecting endangered species are 
significant, then our revealed preference measure will significantly underestimate the true value of such 
protection.  
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act as a (minimum) “revealed preference” for species loss more generally.103 Following 
Simmons and Frost, we assume the true cost of the ESA (including 
compliance/opportunity costs) is sixfold nominal government expenditures, making the 
2004 per species value approximately $6.32 million.104 This is a conservative multiple; 
compliance costs in environmental regulation often dominate direct government 
expenditures by an order of magnitude or more.105 
 We first estimate the cost of climate change with no adjustments for taxonomic 
distribution. The $6.32 million per species revealed preference from 2004 implies a range 
estimate of $4.9–12.0 trillion annually. A serious criticism of this estimate is that it fails 
to account for the fact that ESA expenditures are distributed unevenly. The top 100 
species account for almost 90% of the government expenditures, and the top 50 account 
for a little more than 75%.106 Presumably, opportunity and compliance costs would be 
similarly proportioned. As long as the taxonomic distribution of species threatened by 
climate change is the same as the distribution of currently listed endangered species, this 
should not be a problem. However, this is most unlikely to be the case, as arthropods 
make up the vast majority of existing species but a relatively small portion of the ESA’s 
list, and an even smaller portion of the top 100. (It is worth noting, however, that two 
arthropods do make the ESA top 100 list.) 
 A more plausible estimate thus focuses on vertebrate species. We break down 
expenditures by taxonomy and calculate a value for per-vertebrate loss. Notably, as with 
                                                 
103 See Don Coursey, The Revealed Demand for a Public Good: Evidence from Endangered and Threatened 
Species, 6 Env. Law. J. (1997). 
104 See Simmons and Frost, supra note _.  
105 The exact multiple is likely to vary significantly on a case by case basis; we proceed merely on the 
assumption that there is a rough correlation between government expenditures and total social costs. It is 
worth noting, however, that the sixfold multiple is probably very conservative. The Bonneville Power 
Administration in CA estimated that its compliance costs with regulations governing a single species of 
salmon were approximately $350 million in 1994 (compared to the mere $250 million in total expenditures 
for all species and government entities in that same year). See Brown and Shogren, supra note _. Similarly, 
regulations protecting the California coastal gnatcatcher will likely lead to compliance and opportunity 
costs of up to $5 billion in the period from 2003-2020. Government expenditures for the gnatcatcher, in 
contrast, were only around $1 million in 2004 -- suggesting up to a 294:1 ratio of true costs to expenditures. 
See David L. Sunding, Economic Impacts of Critical Habitat Designation for the Coastal California 
Gnatcatcher, California Resource Management Institute (2003), available at  
http://www.calresources.org/CRMICHGnatcatcherAnalysis.pdf. While the species that have been examined 
carefully for total social costs are unlikely to be perfectly representative, they are at least suggestive of the 
likely average ratio. 
106 See Fish and Wildlife Service, supra note _.  
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the vertebrate analysis using the CV method, we ignore impacts on nonvertebrate life. 
This will serve to bias our estimate downward.  
 
Table 9: ESA Revealed Preference by Taxon 
Taxonomy # Species 
2004 
Expenditures 
($US 2004, 
Millions) 
2004 
Percentage 
Share 
2004 
Expenditures 
(Adjusted) 
Per Species 
Social Cost (6x 
Multiple, $US 
2004, Millions) 
Mammals 86 122 0.15 208 14.51 
Birds 98 103 0.13 176 10.75 
Reptiles 40 42 0.05 72 10.74 
Amphibians 19 8 0.01 14 4.31 
Fish 142 475 0.60 810 34.22 
Total  384 750 0.94 1280 19.98 
Total  
(Excluding Fish) 243 275 0.34 470 11.58 
 
 
Table 9 summarizes per species values by vertebrate taxon. An obvious outlier is 
fish, where the annual per species revealed social value is a whopping $34 million—
arguably the result of mixed use and non-use value.107 One might question why 
commercial fish interests would lobby for endangered species protection rather than 
direct subsidies. We nonetheless calculate net social values both including and excluding 
fish. The results, which are not hugely divergent, are reported in Table 10.   
 
Table 10: Costs of Climate Change to the U.S.: Revealed Preference  
($US 2005, billions, %GDP in Parentheses) 
 
Low Climate 
Change 
High Climate 
Change 
Costs (No Exclusion) 4882 (39.5%) 12043 (96.9%) 
Costs (Excluding Arthropods) 179 (1.4%) 439 (3.5%) 
Costs (Excluding Fish) 104 (0.8%) 255 (2.1%) 
Note: best estimate in bold. 
 
The estimated cost including fish ranges from $179–439 billion annually, or 1.4–
3.5% GDP. The estimated range excluding fish, which should be viewed as the best 
estimate, is $104–255 billion, or 0.8–2.1% GDP. Again, since both of these estimates 
                                                 
107 A representative to the National Marine Fisheries Service offered three explanations for the unusually 
high expenditures on fish. First, many fish species have significant commercial value. Second, fish species 
often serve as indicators (“canaries”) for the health of aquatic ecosystems. Protecting fish therefore 
implicitly entails protecting many other aquatic species. Third, fish implicate many diverse sectors of the 
economy -- fisheries, hydropower, and even the timber industry. Email to Wayne Hsiung from Marta 
Nammack, National Marine Fisheries Service (Sept. 8, 2006).  
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exclude all nonvertebrate life, they should be viewed with skepticism. However, 
(downwardly) biased as they are, the minimum values of these ranges are nonetheless 
very high—$104 billion is nearly as high as the projected annual abatement costs of 
Kyoto.108 
 
D. Summary and Caveats 
 
 Our best estimate of the total cost of climate change in terms of species loss, 
including both use and non-use values, is $162–399 billion, or 1.4–3.5% GDP, using the 
revealed preference method. The range variance is driven by uncertainty in the global 
temperature projections. Thus, we can move from the high end of these cost estimates to 
the low end, if climate change is mitigated. (An approximately 1.2° C mitigation in 
expected climate change will move us from the high climate change scenario to low 
climate change.) 
 
Table 11: Net Costs of Climate Change for the U.S. 
($US 2005, billions, %GDP in Parentheses) 
 Low Climate Change High Climate Change 
Use 58 (0.6%) 144 (1.4%) 
Revealed Preference 104 (0.8%) 255 (2.1%) 
Contingent Value 2565 (27%) 6310 (66%) 
Total (RP) 162 (1.4%) 399 (3.5%) 
Total (CV) 2623 (27.6%) 6454 (67.4%) 
 
 We can now take a fresh look at the costs and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol.109 
While there is significant debate over the effectiveness of Kyoto, some estimates 
anticipate mitigation of approximately 0.15° C by 2100.110 Nordhaus and Boyer have 
suggested that mitigation might be as low as 0.03° C, as fossil fuel emissions shift to 
developing countries. The costs of Kyoto are similarly disputed, but most models suggest 
                                                 
108 See William Nordhaus, Global Warming Economics, 294 Science 1283 (2001) and Terry Barker, infra 
note _.  
109 We focus exclusively on the most-commonly cited version of the protocol that allows permit trading 
between “Annex I” (largely high income) countries.  
110 Parry et al estimate 0.15° C mitigation. The WEC also predicts 0.15° C mitigation. Nordhaus and Boyer, 
in contrast, suggest 0.13° C in an initial paper, but predict a mere 0.03° C in mitigation in their latest 
models. See Martin Parry et al, Buenos Aires and Kyoto targets do little to reduce climate change impacts, 
8 Global Environmental Change 285 (1998); WEC, Global Warming and Global Energy After Kyoto 
(1998); William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Requiem for Kyoto: an economic analysis of the Kyoto 
Protocol, The Energy Journal 93 (1999); and Nordhaus and Boyer, Warming the World, supra note _.   
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annual costs of anywhere from 0–4% of GDP, with a value in the lower end of that range 
(<1%) being most plausible.111 Nordhaus, a skeptic about the treaty, most recently 
estimated annual abatement costs of $125 billion for the U.S.—$186 billion in 2005 
dollars—compared to the $18 billion estimated benefit.112 (For comparative purposes, the 
U.S. budget for national defense is over $400 billion annually.113) 
If species loss (not animal loss as a whole) is included, the calculus is 
significantly changed. Using the revealed preference measure of willingness to pay, we 
estimate that that if the Kyoto Protocol reduces warming by 0.15° C, it would buy around 
$30 billion in annual savings, relative to its worst-case $186 billion annual cost. Even 
under the most conservative cost-benefit assumptions, in other words, the impact of 
climate change on nonhuman life alone justifies almost one sixth of the costs of the 
Kyoto Protocol for the United States. (Under the low, 0.03° C mitigation scenario 
suggested by Nordhaus and Boyer, the Protocol would buy the U.S. $6 billion in annual 
value.) Due to its low anticipated value for the United States, the Kyoto Protocol 
nonetheless continues to impose costs in excess of benefits. But it is noteworthy that the 
benefit-cost calculus is improved significantly by the inclusion of nonhuman life.  
The picture for the rest of the world is even better. While both our contingent 
value and revealed preference data is drawn from U.S. sources, we can make a back-of-
the-envelope calculation for the rest of the world by using U.S. proportion of global GDP 
as a scaling factor.114 The predicted value of the Kyoto Protocol in protecting natural 
biological systems is $74 billion for the rest of the world, making the total value of the 
Protocol approximately $78 billion for the rest of the world.115 The net value of the treaty 
for the world is still negative, at –$77 billion annually, however, given the heavy U.S. 
costs.  
 
                                                 
111 For a survey of various models, see  Terry Barker and Paul Ekins, The Costs of Kyoto for the US 
Economy, 25 The Energy Journal 53 (2004). See also William Nordhaus, Global Warming Economics, 294 
Science 1283 (2001) and Lomborg, supra note _, at 303.  
112 See Nordhaus, supra note _. 
113 See National Defense Budget for FY 2006, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, available at 
<http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2006/index.html>.  
114 The key assumption in this calculation is that the rest of the world is willing to spend to protect 
nonhuman life in proportion to its GDP.  
115 We use Nordhaus and Boyer’s 2000 data for our calculations of the benefits value of the Kyoto Protocol 
to the United States and the world. See Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note _, ch. 8.  
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Table 12: Value of Kyoto ($US 2005, Billions Annually) 
U.S. Value (excluding Animals) –185 
U.S. Savings from Protection of Animals 30 
U.S. Total –155 
Rest of World Value (excluding Animals) 4 
Rest of World Savings from Protection of Animals 74 
Rest of World Total 78 
World Total (including U.S.) –77 
 
 One large problem with our estimates of the value of Kyoto is that they presume 
that mitigation is permanent when, in fact, Kyoto and most other mitigation strategies 
will merely slow, rather than prevent, the onset of climate change.116 Under our no-
discounting assumption, this is especially problematic—if the damage will inevitably 
occur at some point in the near future, there is no true “savings” from mitigation. Unlike 
many of the other harms from climate change, moreover, additional time probably will 
not be useful for adaptation purposes; again, global ecosystems cannot adapt, even with 
human assistance, at the pace of climate change. For these reasons, our estimate of the 
value of Kyoto should be viewed skeptically.  
It is worth reiterating that our estimates of the cost of climate change include a 
number of conservative assumptions. First and most notably, we have ignored any 
impacts of climate change short of extinction. In contrast, both the use and non-use value 
of nonhuman life will be dramatically affected by declines in population and suffering 
independent of extinction. Even species that survive will face habitat loss of up to 85%, 
under high-end climate change scenarios—with population declines of similar 
magnitude.117 One could plausibly amplify all of our cost estimates by a substantial figure 
on this basis. At first glance, an 85% multiplier might be the place to start. To the extent 
that people place a special premium on the loss of species, however, that figure is likely 
to be far too high. Nonetheless, an estimate of WTP for the loss of many millions of 
animals would undoubtedly produce substantial figures. And if human WTP does not 
adequately capture that loss—as we believe—than such an estimate is itself likely to be 
far too low. 
 Second, our reported “best estimates” of non-use value have neglected 
nonvertebrate life entirely. This is necessary because of data limitations. CV studies tend 
                                                 
116 See Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note _, at Ch. 8.  
117 Correspondence with Prof. Chris Thomas, University of York (June 22, 2006).  
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to examine charismatic mammals and birds rather than insects or plants. The ESA 
expenditures we use for revealed preference analysis cluster around a similar set of 
organisms. Nonvertebrates nonetheless account for approximately 5% of total ESA 
expenditures.118 It might be reasonable, therefore, to increase our non-use estimates by 
that factor.  
 Third, we have made a number of assumptions that have an unquantifiable but 
downward impact on cost estimates. For example, we assume a low-end value for the 
number of species and the number of vertebrates. We ignore the impact of a possible 
increase in extreme weather events. And we do not even attempt to quantify the risk of 
catastrophic ecosystem destruction stemming from abrupt climate change. All of these 
factors will serve to downwardly bias our estimates.  
 Fourth, in our evaluation of Kyoto, we ignore the potential learning value of the 
protocol, in establishing a test case and framework for future international agreements on 
climate change. Indeed, if we conceive of Kyoto as the first step in a series of 
progressively-steeper greenhouse gas reductions (that will eventually apply to developing 
as well as developed countries), evaluating the agreement’s costs and benefits on the 
margin might be entirely inappropriate.119 
 On the other hand, there are some reasons to think that our estimates of the cost of 
climate change might be biased upward. First, we assume that individuals in the U.S. 
value unknown and foreign wildlife as much as they value domestic wildlife. Revealed 
preference analysis suggests dramatic differences in the value of domestic versus foreign 
human lives.120 Might the same be true for animals?  
Since the FWS has no jurisdiction over foreign wildlife, we cannot compare 
expenditures for domestic and foreign species in any precise fashion. We offer two 
reasons, however, to think that the difference between domestic and foreign species value 
may not be significant. First, modern human life is so detached from wildlife that, to the 
vast majority of individuals, a domestic endangered species is as “foreign” as a foreign 
                                                 
118 See Fish and Wildlife Service, supra note _. 
119 Even Nordhaus, a Kyoto skeptic, concedes the learning value of the protocol. See Nordhaus, supra note 
_, at 1284. 
120 See Wojciech Kopszuk et al., The Limitations of Decentralized World Redistribution: An Optimal 
Taxation Approach, 30 European Economic Review 1051 (2005). Kopszuk estimates, by revealed 
preference, that foreign lives are valued at 1/2000th the value of domestic lives.  
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one. For example, among the top 10 most valuable species, by ESA expenditures, are the 
red-cockaded woodpecker, pallid sturgeon, and right whale; are such species any less 
foreign than polar bears or giant pandas?121 Second, it is not even clear which way the 
foreign/domestic distinction should cut, if there is a difference. Foreign and exotic 
species (tigers, elephants, etc.) might very well be more prized, precisely because of their 
rarity on U.S. lands. Indeed, public and private organizations in the U.S. spend many 
millions of dollars annually on a handful of foreign giant pandas, possibly making the 
panda the most valued endangered species, on a per animal basis, in this country.122 
A second possible source of upward bias is our failure to discount. As a result of 
scientific uncertainty in the SAR models, we cannot discount use value with any degree 
of accuracy. And in our analysis of non-use value, we assume that there are no significant 
timing differences between extinction caused by climate change, and other sources such 
as habitat loss.  
Third, we treat our measures of use and non-use value as conceptually 
independent when, in fact, there might be significant overlap—e.g., the high ESA 
expenditures to protect threatened fish.123 This is not a serious problem for the contingent 
valuation analysis, since the use value is trivial relative to our calculated non-use values.  
However, our central, revealed preference estimate would be significantly reduced—up 
to 50%—by any redundancy in use and non-use value. 
 Finally, we should note again that we assume a linear value or cost function for 
species loss. In reality, there are probably ranges of convexity and concavity. The recent 
and vast increases in per species expenditures under the ESA suggest that we are 
currently in a range of convexity. But at some point well short of 100% of GDP, society 
would presumably decide to stop paying for species protection, or at least significantly 
reduce its marginal willingness to pay.124 
                                                 
121 To be sure, this would not be true of some forms of use value. However, our use value calculations do 
not depend on the foreign/domestic distinction, since we are not using a species multiple.  
122 See Brenda Goodman, Eats Shoots, Leaves and Much of Zoos’ Budgets, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2006 and 
Lynne Warren, Panda Inc., National Geographic, July 2006.  
123 Of course, we exclude fish from our revealed preference analysis. However, it might be the case that 
commercial interests are important in other cases.  
124 Putting the disputed nature of animal rights aside, this will be true due to income effects. That is, if 
society were actually spending a significant portion of GDP to protect animals, total social wealth would be 
reduced. And at reduced wealth levels, demand for all goods and services will decrease.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
 Our principal goal in this Article has been to suggest that climate change threatens 
to kill countless animals, and that their suffering and death should matter to climate 
change policy. By all estimates, climate change is causing, and will cause, a massive loss 
of animal life and also produce a great deal of suffering. An adequate accounting of the 
costs of climate change must take account of these effects. 
 At the same time, we have attempted to explore some of the complexities in 
assigning monetary values to species and animals. We have distinguished between two 
overlapping but independent sets of losses: extinction of species and harms done to 
particular animals. Both of these losses should be included in the overall calculation. 
Because of limitations in existing data, we have focused only on the loss of species, with 
the belief that this loss is an important component of the problem. 
On the basis of current climate change projections, a plausible and conservative 
range estimate of lost use values, for the world as a whole, is from $.0.5–1.3 trillion 
annually. A plausible and conservative estimate of lost non-use values, for the world as a 
whole, is from $0.6–1.5 trillion annually. For the United States, the corresponding figures 
are $58–144 billion in lost use value and $104–255 billion in lost non-use value. We have 
argued, moreover, that these estimates might be downwardly biased because we ignore 
harms short of extinction; ignore impacts on nonvertebrate life; and fail to account for a 
possible increase in extreme weather events.  On the other hand, our estimates might be 
upwardly biased because we fail to closely examine the distributional mix of threatened 
species (e.g., foreign versus domestic); do not even attempt to discount; and treat our 
measures of use and non-use value as completely nonredundant. Finally, there is a serious 
and unanswered question about the curvature of the species value function. Our 
estimates, therefore, are necessarily tentative.  
 We have nonetheless used our analysis to take a fresh look at the costs and 
benefits of the Kyoto Protocol. If the Kyoto Protocol reduces warming by 0.15 C, we 
have estimated that its benefits, to Americans, increase by $30 billion annually, and for 
the world by $74 billion (with the major caveat that these savings might not be sustained 
without a permanent and long-term solution to climate change). Wider and deeper 
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restrictions on greenhouse gases—for example, those that include developing countries, 
above all China, a growing contributor—would deliver correspondingly larger benefits.  
 Our central claim here is that, for too long, the debate over climate change policy 
has been conducted without paying significant attention to nonhuman life. In our view, 
animals have intrinsic value, and that value should be included in any judgment about 
appropriate regulation. But our emphasis has been on existing human valuations, not on 
abstract claims about the appropriate treatment of species and individual animals. To that 
extent we bracket some of the most controversial claims about animal welfare. If 
regulators attend to human valuations of nonhuman life, they will find that existing 
estimates of the costs of climate change are far too low.  
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